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Conventional models of the industrial organisation theory usually state that in concentrated industries firms have 
significant market power, and that competition can be easily reduced if the leading firms collude. However, 
recent theoretical analyses show that strong concentration does not necessarily prevent competition among firms. 
In this paper we consider the Italian banking industry, where the eight largest firms operate at a national level, 
manage about a half of total loans, and have a notably larger dimension than the other competitors. We estimate 
a structural model – formed by a demand equation, a cost equation and a price-cost margin equation, the latter 
containing a behavioural parameter – to assess the market conduct of the largest banks for the period 1988-2000. 
Our finding is that, in spite of their noteworthy size and significant market share, in these years the largest banks 
have been characterised by a more competitive conduct than the Cournot outcome: this is in line with the results 
of the latest literature of the field, for which in the banking industry there is often no conflict between 
competition and concentration. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
In the past two decades, European banking markets have been subjected to structural changes, 
which were caused by modifications occurred in the external environment especially as a 
consequence of the increasing monetary and financial integration. The gradual liberalisation of 
capital flows and the prospect of a common market have undoubtedly influenced the policy of the 
domestic banks, also concerned about the competitive pressure from foreign rivals. This has pushed 
banks to search for more efficient organisational solutions, greater variety of the offered services 
and stronger exploitation of scale economies. The last of these phenomena has taken place thanks to 
the increasing consolidation. It generally consisted in the acquisition (either partial or total) of 
ownership of national or foreign credit institutions as well as in making agreements with other 
banks, and has led to a fall in the number of banks. 
It is crucial to assess whether such modifications have had an impact on the degree of 
competition characterising the banking industry, because of the potential for monopoly power that 
the consolidation process could produce. Actually, when compared with the beginning of the last 
decade, the main Italian credit institutions now enjoy both a larger size and a higher proportion of 
deposits and loans. 
This paper aims to evaluate the degree of competition of the eight Italian largest banks (the only 
operating throughout the whole country, and also involved in many mergers and acquisitions) 
during the period from 1988 to 2000. In this way, we are able to evaluate their average conduct, and 
thus shed light on the possibility that few large and important banks could use their dimension and 
market leadership to act as colluding oligopolists, therefore gaining all the advantages linked to the 
ongoing consolidation at the expense of customers. 
The next section gives a brief picture of the structural evolution of the Italian banking industry 
over the recent years, together with a survey of the most commonly used empirical approaches for 
investigating the presence of competition in banking markets. Section 3 is devoted to the theoretical 
description of the conjectural variation model that we use to assess the level of competition among 
the Italian largest banks. Section 4 describes the sample characteristics and discusses the estimation 
results. Some conclusions are given in the last section. 
 
 
2. The recent evolution of the Italian banking market 
 
Over the last fifteen years, a profound process of consolidation occurred in the Italian banking 
industry, which gave rise to significant transformations, both economic and organisational. The 
above phenomenon is common to all the European banking markets, and derives from the 
phenomenon of “disintermediation” (the weakened role of banks as financial intermediaries
1), the 
integration process and the related opening of the domestic financial markets, and the adoption of 
the single currency. 
In this context, commercial banks have been forced to search for scale and scope economies, 
with the aim of increasing their efficiency. In Italy, a significant signal of these changes is that from 
1988 to 2000 the number of commercial banks dropped from 1100 to 841 (a 24% decrease). 
Moreover, in the decade 1990-2000 there were 356 mergers or acquisitions. Simultaneously, the 
elimination of the authorisation to open additional branches (adopted in 1990 in order to promote 
the increase in competition in local markets, often characterised by a high degree of concentration) 
led to an increase of the number of branches: in the period 1988-2000 they passed from 15363 to 
28175 (a 83% increase). As a result, in each province (an administrative area comprising a bigger 
town or city and several little neighbouring towns) in 2000 there were on average 31 operating 
                                                 
1 For some details concerning the Italian context, see BRUNI (1982), VICARELLI (1982) and COCCORESE (1998b).   - 2 - 
banks (20 in 1980); in the same year, 80% of the population could choose among 3 banks, up from 
58% in 1980
2. 
The belief of the Central Bank of Italy is that in the national banking industry (characterised by a 
prevalence of small-scale banks) there is room for exploiting wide scale economies, without 
prejudice to the market niches of local little banks. At the same time, mergers and acquisitions are 
considered as a beneficial solution compared to the closure of inefficient banks, since their exit is 
expected to involve economic and social costs. 
In spite of the outlined changes, commercial banks have been able to maintain their outstanding 
role in the Italian economy and particularly in the national financial system. Actually, the reduction 
in the number of banks has been balanced by a remarkable increase in the number of branches, so 
that nowadays the Italian banking system has still the control, either directly or indirectly, of a 
substantial part of national savings. 
Nevertheless, such changes have also amplified the concern that the reorganisation may have 
adverse consequences on competition as a result of the bigger market power gained by leading 
banks through mergers. This is especially true when there is a small number of banks with 
significant dimension and market share: bigger and fewer banks can find it easier to collude, charge 
higher rates on loans, pay less interest on deposits and charge higher fees for the offered services
3. 
Accordingly, the current process of structural consolidation, related to the aspiration of an 
improvement in efficiency to face the enhanced competition, has cast doubts on the possibility that 
a competitive conduct is still possible in the banking industry. This fear derives from the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, where the degree of competition in a market is a direct 
function of the number of firms and an inverse function of the average market share
4. So, a higher 
concentration (fewer and larger firms) is likely to give rise to an anticompetitive conduct. The 
above theoretical framework is surely coherent, but the occurrence of certain conditions can lead to 
alternative results. One example is given by contestability, which emerges when there are no sunk 
costs and the hit-and-run behaviour by potential firms is possible
5. With free entry and exit, a 
monopolist will prevent competition by setting fairly competitive prices: in this case, contestability 
ensures competitive behaviour irrespective of the number of active firms
6. In addition, in some 
markets high concentration and profits might derive from the higher efficiency of firms rather than 
from substantial market power. 
The previous point emphasises the significant role that an empirical investigation could play in 
assessing the degree of competition in an industry. The economic literature offers various 
techniques for exploring this question
7. The traditional approach examines the relationship between 
structure (proxied mainly through the Herfindahl index) and return (in terms of either profitability 
or price), since – according to the SCP paradigm – a positive link could imply imperfect 
competition
8. With reference to the banking industry, influential papers employing this 
methodology are those by Berger and Hannan (1989), Rhoades (1995), and Hannan (1997). A 
difficulty with this approach is that it is not possible to find a clear benchmark for competitive 
returns; furthermore, the empirical evidence for the existence of a relationship between 
concentration and market power is mixed. 
Another method consists in a comparative-statics analysis where the identification of market 
power is obtained through an index (the H-statistic) calculated as the sum of the elasticities of the 
                                                 
2 See FAZIO (2000), p. 23*. 
3 For a discussion on concentration, competition and efficiency in the European banking markets, see MOLYNEUX 
(1999). 
4 These linkages, first formalised by MASON (1939), were developed by BAIN (1951). See also STIGLER (1964) and 
SCHERER (1970). 
5 The main reference for this theory is the book by BAUMOL, PANZAR and WILLIG (1982). 
6 COCCORESE (1995) discusses the possibility that the Italian banking market exhibits characteristics of contestability. 
7 See CETORELLI (1999) for an overview of the methodologies used in the analysis of competition in the banking 
industry. 
8 A comprehensive survey on these and related topics is given by GILBERT (1984).   - 3 - 
reduced-form revenue with respect to all the factor prices
9. In the latest years, this technique has 
been applied to the banking industry by Shaffer (1982), Nathan and Neave (1989), Molyneux et al. 
(1994), Coccorese (1998a, 2001), Bikker and Groeneveld (1998), De Bandt and Davis (2000), and 
Bikker and Haaf (2000). 
A third possibility is the estimation of a simultaneous-equation model, where a parameter 
representing the behaviour of firms (and therefore the degree of their market power) is included. It 
can be interpreted as a conjectural variation coefficient
10, or as the deviation of the perceived 
marginal revenue schedule of a firm in the industry from the demand schedule
11. Empirical 
implementations of this technique within a banking context have been performed by Shaffer (1989, 
1993), Berg and Kim (1994), Shaffer and DiSalvo (1994), Coccorese (1998b), and Angelini and 
Cetorelli (2000). The advantage of this approach is the direct analysis of the firms’ conduct (rather 
than the overall market structure), thus avoiding indirect (and sometimes ambiguous) inferences 
about market power through indicators of concentration. The main limitation is the need of detailed 
information on costs and demand
12. 
Our study conforms to the last approach. It tries to verify whether the assertion that “there is a 
great deal of market power, in the sense of price-cost margins, in some concentrated industries”
13 is 
applicable to the banking industry. We consider the Italian context, where only eight banks can be 
considered as “national”, meaning that their reference market is the whole country, while the other 
banks generally have a much more limited area of business. As a matter of fact, the data show that 
local banking markets are mainly oligopolies, where the most powerful firms are small-size banks. 
It has been calculated that in more than half of the Italian provinces only two banks account for half 
of the deposits, while in another third of provinces only three are necessary
14. 
The local forms of oligopoly can be explained by considering the possibility that, due to the 
presence of asymmetric information between lenders (banks) and borrowers (customers), some 
assets could not be recovered entirely, and hence are sunk costs. Particularly, a bank loan represents 
a sunk cost depending on its category. For example, if a bank wants to leave the market, assets like 
government bonds, interbank loans and credits to large-size firms may not be regarded as sunk 
costs, since the whole market knows the debtor’s degree of solvency. In contrast, the credits linked 
to a guarantee as well as the specific loans (especially if they have been given to small firms) can be 
considered as sunk costs to a much larger extent, because they imply a personal relationship 
between creditor and debtor whose specificity hinders its transfer to other credit institutions, who 
do not know the exact associated degree of risk. We can conclude that there is strong competition 
between banks for the loans to large firms due to the absence of sunk costs, while on the other hand 
the information asymmetries, and related costs of exit, persuade a bank operating in a local market 
– no matter its size – to reduce its competitive pressure on the other rivals, or even to come to a 
collusive agreement with them
15. 
In this picture, the role of the largest (i.e. national) banks needs to be established. It is believable 
that they are able to exercise competitive pressures also in local concentrated markets because of 
their dimension and the resulting possibility of enjoying scale economies, which could balance the 
lack of territorial roots and information about the local clientele. Moreover, the significant 
proportion of managed deposits and loans could induce them to cooperative agreements in order to 
better exploit their dominant position and act as leaders. Finally, in the last years they have been 
characterised by an outstanding consolidation trend (mergers and acquisitions) that has allowed 
them to gain access to local markets too. 
                                                 
9 See ROSSE and PANZAR (1977), and PANZAR and ROSSE (1987). 
10 See IWATA (1974), APPELBAUM (1979, 1982), ROBERTS (1984), ROLLER and SICKLER (2000). 
11 See BRESNAHAN (1982), LAU (1982), ALEXANDER (1988). 
12 See CETORELLI (1999), p. 6-7. 
13 See BRESNAHAN (1989), p. 1052. 
14 See PADOA-SCHIOPPA (1995), p. 55*-56*. 
15 Starting from these issues, DI BATTISTA and GRILLO (1988) use the theory of contestability to analyse the role and 
extent of competition in Italian banking industry. On the same argument, see also COCCORESE (1998a), p. 185-186.   - 4 - 
Tables 1 and 2 help to depict a thorough picture of the structural characteristics and the evolution 




3. A conjectural variation model of competition 
 
In the following analysis, we focus on the largest banks only, treating them as the only firms in 
the market. This assumption is approximately correct considering the above description of the 
Italian banking industry. In spite of the many banks operating at a local level, the “national” market 
is an oligopoly where only the eight main banks can compete: they can exploit scale economies and 
rely on a good and established reputation, also secured by their dimension that avoids the thread of 
new entries. Competition among these banks takes place especially on the demand for loans coming 
from the largest national producers. At the same time, in local credit markets (i.e. in the various 
limited geographical areas) they must also face the fierce competition from the little banks. Data 
display this situation: as Table 2 points out, the eight banks under consideration manage about half 
of loans. Nonetheless, the role of the other banks is still potentially important, and the largest 
banks’ behavioural parameter we are going to estimate can detect it. 
We use a price-setting model, thus assuming product differentiation between firms as well as 
price competition. The hypothesis is that for every bank the demand for loans depends on its own 
price, the price of rivals and other exogenous factors, particularly national income and bank size. 
Each bank is supposed to face the following demand function: 
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where  qit is the quantity demanded, pit is the price charged by bank i,  pjt is an index of the 
competitors’ prices, Dit is a vector of exogenous factors which affect demand, and N is the number 
of banks here considered (therefore, eight). 
For each bank, we will use a weighted average price of the other seven banks as a proxy of the 
opponents’ price. In this way, we treat the market for loans as a duopolistic market, where each firm 
faces a single rival whose dimension is the average dimension of the seven remaining banks, and 
therefore the demand for each firm depends only on the average price of this group of firms
16. In 
addition, we consider only one output (i.e. loans): in spite of the multi-product nature of banks, this 
assumption seems widely acceptable given that credit intermediation is still the predominant 
activity of commercial banks. 
We expect that the own-price elasticity of demand is negative, while its magnitude reflects 
whether consumers regard the loans of the considered banks as poor or good substitutes. We also 
expect that the own-price elasticity is larger than the cross-price elasticity, if we admit that banks 
are able to soften price competition by providing other fringe services. 
It seems important to take into account the reaction of customers through the evaluation of the 
elasticity coefficients: the possibility of exploiting some market power would surely force banks 
toward an increase in loan rates, but in this case a high demand elasticity would also remarkably 
reduce the demand for loans as a consequence of the price increase. Therefore, banks will not be 
able to use entirely their market power, and there will be also the possibility that some of them 
lower prices in order to increase their market share at expense of others. In the latter case, an 
increase in competition will result. 
The cost function is assumed to be affected by the quantity of output qit as well as the price wit of 
input factors: 
 
                                                 
16 See also ROLLER and SICKLES (2000), p. 849.   - 5 - 
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Omitting the time subscript for notational convenience, we can write the profit function of each 
bank in the following way: 
 
() i i i i i i q C p q w p ), ( ) ( × - × = .                  ( 3 )  
 
The maximisation program implies that 
 














































= ×) ( is the marginal cost function. Rearranging the above expression, the first-order 
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= l  is the conjectural variation parameter of firm i. If identified, 
this conjectural derivative expresses the degree of coordination of banks. A positive value of l 
indicates that a firm expects the rivals to match its price, thus cooperating in holding revenues at a 
profitable level. Perfectly collusive behaviour is characterised by a unit value of l. When l = 0, the 
behaviour is coherent with a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in prices, because each firm does not 
consider rivals’ choices when setting its price (and it does not react to changes in the other firms’ 
behaviour). Finally, a negative conjectural derivative means that a firm contemplating a price 
increase expects its rivals to react in a competitive fashion by reducing their prices
17. Perfect 
competition implies that l = – ¥, what changes expression (5) in the well-known competitive 
equilibrium condition p = MC. 
The conjectural variation index l is identified in the system formed by equations (1), (2) and (5). 
With reference to costs, we consider a translog function, which is common in the analysis of 
banking markets since this functional form can deal with both scale and scope economies in the 
multiproduct firms
18. Given m generic inputs and one output, firm i’s total cost function is 
therefore: 
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17 See MARTIN (1993), p. 25. 
18 The translog function was first proposed by CHRISTENSEN et al. (1971), and then extended to the multiproduct 
context by BROWN et al. (1979). Among the several applications to banking industry, we recall the studies by GILLIGAN 
et al. (1982) and MESTER (1987). Specific studies on Italian depository institutions are those by COSSUTTA et al. 
(1988), BALDINI and LANDI (1990) and CONIGLIANI et al. (1991).   - 6 - 
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where ACi is the average cost and wri are the prices of input factors (r = 1, ..., m). In our analysis we 
assume the intermediation model of a bank
19, where deposits are considered an intermediate input 
in the production of loans, in conjunction with other factors. 
The market demand function, corresponding to (1), is postulated to be as follows: 
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where  qi and pi are the quantity and the price of the output of bank i, respectively, pj is the 
calculated average value expressing the price of all the other banks, Y is national income (a measure 
of economic activity), BRi is the number of branches of each bank (a variable that tries to capture 
the network size effect of the firm on its own demand), and ei is an error term. 
Concerning the translog cost function, we will use two alternative specifications: a two-factor 
function (deposits and labour), and a three-factor function (deposits, labour and physical capital). It 
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where ji is an error term. 
It is not possible to predict the sign of the coefficients of the variables in the translog cost 
equation, but there are some conditions that are generally imposed on the coefficients of such a cost 
function
20. The above formulation makes possible to avoid the test for symmetry
21. Linear 





















r b . However, we 
will not impose any initial restriction
22. 
Given the above translog specification of the cost function, and substituting (7) in (5), simple 
manipulations yield: 
 
                                                 
19 See KLEIN (1971) and SEALEY and LINDLEY (1977) for details about this model, which has been used in several 
banking cost studies. 
20 See for example BERGER et al. (1987). 
21 Symmetry in the coefficients of produced goods is ruled out by the fact that we consider only one output (loans). 
Symmetry in the coefficients of input prices would be necessary if we estimate different parameters both for lnvrlnvs 
and lnvslnvr, (r = 1,...,m; s = 1,...,m), like in (2a), rather than only one coefficient for each pair of multiplications, as 
we do by using the function (2b). 
22 We tested for linear homogeneity after performing the regressions: in all models, a chi-square test did not reject any 
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where fi is an error term. 
Hence, the system to be estimated (labelled as Model 1) is formed by equations (1a), (2b) and 
(5a). If the market conduct parameter l can be identified through this estimation, it describes the 
degree of coordination in our price-setting game context. Actually, this index reflects the average 
behaviour of the banks considered: therefore, the presence of a collusive (competitive) behaviour 
should give rise to positive (negative) values of l. 
Given the nature of our dataset, it seems appropriate to estimate also an alternative model, which 
tries to capture firm-specific and time effects. For this purpose, we propose another system (Model 
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To account for the economic expansion occurred in the period under exam, a quadratic time 
trend has been added in all equations. Furthermore, in the demand and cost equations
23 the intercept 
term has been substituted by bank-specific dummy intercepts (BD). Finally, in the price-cost margin 
equation we estimate separate conjectural indexes lk for each of the eight banks. 
Other models have been estimated with the purpose of isolating the effects due either to time or 
firms’ specificity. Model 3 is the same as Model 2, but with a common index l. Model 4 contains 
the dummy variables BDk and lk, without the time trend. The same happens in Model 5, but here 
again we estimate a common derivative l instead of specific indexes for each bank. In Model 6 we 
consider the time trend as well as different lk’s, but omit the BD variables. Lastly, Model 7 is 
similar to Model 6, with the exception of the behavioural parameter, which is estimated as a single 
common coefficient.  
 
 
                                                 
23 In analogy with the previous model, we did not impose any restriction on the coefficients of the new cost equation, 
and we have tested for linear homogeneity in input prices. Again, in all estimations a chi-square test did not reject this 
hypothesis at the 5% level.    - 8 - 
4. Data and estimation 
 
The sample considers the period 1988-2000, and for each year data have been collected for the 
eight nationwided banks. Hence, it consists of 104 observations for each regression. Appendix A 
reports the list of the banks analysed as well as a description of the data used for the estimation. 
In the demand equations (1), the quantity of output for each bank, qi, is measured by the value of 
loans and the price of output for that bank, pi, is given by the interest rate earned on loans, which is 
calculated as the ratio between interest revenue and total loans. The coefficient of pi is expected to 
be negative, thus conforming to a downward-sloping demand curve. An analogous procedure is 
followed for the calculation of pj: accordingly, the price of the rivals is still computed as an average 
interest rate on loans (given by the ratio between the interest revenue of all the “other” banks and 
their loans). Its coefficient is expected to be positive if loans are substitutable across banks. 
National income Y is measured by the Gross Domestic Product, and is expected to have a positive 
influence on the level of banking services demand. Finally, the coefficient of BRi should be also 
positive as long as the number of branches represents a good proxy of the banks’ network size 
effect over the loan demand. 
As already stated, the inputs considered here are deposits, labour and (in an alternative 
formulation of the cost function) physical capital. For a correct specification of l, we must assume 
that banks are input price-takers. This is probably true for labour and physical capital, since for 
these inputs banks compete with other firms for their acquisition. With reference to deposits, the 
assumption would be also correct if the deposit interest rates were not under banks’ control: this is 
probably what happened in the period examined here, mainly because of the fierce competition 
coming from government bonds as well as from smaller banks
24. 
In equations (2) and (5), the price of deposits, w1i, is measured as the average interest rate on 
deposits (computed as the ratio between interest expenses and deposits), and the price of labour, 
w2i, is calculated as the ratio between total labour costs and the number of employees. In the 
estimation that includes the price of physical capital, w3i, it is measured as the value of all net 
operating costs different from those related to deposits and labour, divided by the funds under 
management, a ratio that represents a good proxy for the unit cost of capital
25. Lastly, the average 
cost ACi is calculated as the ratio between total costs and loans. 
All variables (in euro) are expressed in 1995 values and were deflated by the Gross Domestic 
Product deflator. Summary statistics of the data and the list with the names of the variables are 
shown in Appendix B. Systems are estimated simultaneously through non-linear three-stage least 
squares. Tables 3a and 3b display the estimation results. In these tables we do not report the values 
of the firm-specific dummy variables, but we provide the Wald statistics for the null hypotheses that 
they are jointly zero and that they are equal to a common value: the above tests are always rejected 
at the 5% level. 
Let us first consider the two-factor system specification, formed by equations (1a)-(2b)-(5a). The 
results are shown in Table 3a. In the demand equation the coefficients of pi and pj have the expected 
sign (negative and positive, respectively), and are both statistically significant, mostly at the 1% 
level. Therefore, the empirical evidence confirms a downward-sloping demand function as well as a 
positive cross-price elasticity for loans. The estimated value of both the coefficients of pi and pj 
drops when the bank-specific dummies BD are included: particularly, without these coefficients the 
demand for loans appears to be elastic, given that we reject the hypothesis that a1 £ |1|, while the 
insertion of the BD’s makes it inelastic. The cross-price elasticity is always smaller than the 
absolute own-price elasticity, confirming our expectations that loans are more sensitive to variation 
in pi rather than in pj. However, the difference between the two values is not high, and this fact 
                                                 
24 See SHAFFER (1993) and COCCORESE (1998b). 
25 GILLIGAN and SMIRLOCK (1984) and other authors hold that the price of the physical capital can be considered as 
constant across the samples. SHAFFER (1993) argues that this is more realistic in a cross section than in a time series.   - 9 - 
could be a first indicator of a considerable level of competition among the banks. A larger gap 
between the coefficient of pi and pj occurs only in Models 6 and 7. 
The variable Y has a positive and statistically significant coefficient only when both the BD 
dummies and the time trend are included in the equations: in this situation, since the estimated 
coefficient is greater than 4, we expect a remarkable growth in the demand for loans as long as the 
economy is characterised by an expansion (measured through the real GDP). The coefficient of BRi 
is positive and significant, meaning that a wider branch network allows a larger increase in the 
demand for loans of bank i. In terms of magnitude, it is larger in those models that take account of 
the bank-specific dummies BD. When significant, the effect of time on loans consists in a fall in 
their demand. 
In the cost equation, the estimated coefficients show that banks are operating where average 
costs lie above marginal costs, that is, in a region of economies of scale. This finding parallels the 
results of previous studies on cost banking functions and suggests that new entries in the “national” 
market, if possible, are unattractive because of the presence of a notable size effect (already 
captured by the coefficient of BRi in the demand equation). For this equation, the quadratic time 
trend is highly significant in all regressions, and captures a cost reduction in the most recent years. 
The value of the “average” conjectural parameter l is negative and significant (Models 1, 3 and 
5). Its value ranges from -0.4182 to -2.7925 and -3.1203, according to whether we skip both the BD 
dummies and the time trend, include the BD’s only, or include both. These values are significantly 
different (at 5% level) from +1 and 0. The only striking deviation is in Model 7, where the value of 
l (even though small in size) is positive and significant. As a consequence, for three of four models 
with common l, we are able to reject the hypothesis that in the Italian banking industry there is 
evidence of monopoly power or coordination between banks. Furthermore, banks’ behaviour 
appears to be more competitive than in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in prices. Therefore, the results 
show that in Italy the banking market is characterised by a certain degree of competition, although 
imperfect. This conjecture agrees with the results of other studies that investigate the market power 
of the credit institutions within the Italian banking industry in the same years. Actually, some of 
them have shown that monopolistic competition is the best description of the local banking 
market
26. 
The above comments remain true also when considering the results of the models with firm-
specific conjectural indexes. Even if there is a relaxing in their significance when passing from 
models with a one common l to the corresponding models with individual lk’s, we always observe 
a remarkable increase in the estimated values. In any case, they are always significant at least at the 
10% level, and their average value is significantly different from +1 and 0 at least at 10% level 
(with the exception of Model 6, where none of them is significantly different from zero). Again, we 
reject the joint collusion hypothesis among banks; in contrast, their behaviour seems to be more 
competitive than the Cournot outcome.  
Hence, even though no threat of possible entrants should exist (given the existence of scale 
economies), the estimated degree of competition, usually lying between the perfectly competitive 
and the Cournot values, indicates a fairly competitive pattern of behaviour. This can be deducted 
also by calculating the mark-up over marginal costs in equation (5a). For example, in Model 1 it is 
equal to 40.6%, and in Model 5 to 33.1%: considering that the Cournot-Nash behaviour (l = 0) 
implies a mark-up of 57% and 123.5%, respectively (and the cartel hypothesis much higher), 
pricing in the considered banking market appears rather competitive. Our results seem therefore to 
support the policy of the Central Bank of Italy, that has cautiously favoured a tendency to 
                                                 
26 See COCCORESE (1998a), BIKKER and HAAF (2000) and DE BANDT and DAVIS (2000). In the first of these studies, the 
monopolistic competition outcome is explained as a compromise between local monopolies or oligopolies from little 
banks and the competitive pressure coming from large banks operating at a national level. COCCORESE (2001) finds 
evidence of a relationship between the local economic performance and the degree of competition among banks: they 
appear to behave as perfectly competitive firms where local macroeconomic data show lower unemployment rates, 
greater per capita GDP and lower market loan rates.   - 10 - 
concentration in the Italian banking industry during the last years (in accordance with the Antitrust 
Authority), also when it involves large banks. 
It is worth to note that we never reject the hypothesis that the eight lk’s are equal to the same 
value. This supports the view that the estimation with only one conjectural variation derivative 
(representing the average conduct of banks) is trustfully acceptable as well. We also observe that 
the absolute value of the estimated own-price elasticity is larger when the estimated l’s or lk’s are 
of smaller magnitude. According to this result, in our assumed model of product differentiation 
(where banks are supposed to act as monopolists in their market niches), when firms are operating 
where their demand is perceived to be elastic the equilibrium ensures them some market power, 
which is detected by a lower estimate of l. 
Finally, the estimated time trend for the third equation is always significant and shows us a fall 
in the price-cost margin during the considered years. For example, in Model 3 we note that the 
average mark-up over marginal costs is equal to 20.5%. Along with equation (5b), we can 
decompose this value in two parts: the first is related to the behavioural parameter l, amounting to 
32.3% (very close to 33.1% estimated for Model 5); the second reproduces the time effect, being 
equal to -11.8%. Hence, the introduction of the time trend provokes a 37% fall in the mark-up 
value, and can be interpreted as an additional signal of increased competition among banks. 
The three-factor specification models, formed by equations (1b)-(2c)-(5b), generally confirm the 
above results and comments (see Table 3b). Particularly, the addition of the price of capital does not 
have notable effects on the estimates of the demand coefficients and the conjectural derivative 
(where all coefficients keep their sign and magnitude), nor on the R-square of the three equations. 
We notice that the significance of the various l’s increases slightly; with reference to the firm-
specific behavioural parameters, their average is significantly different from +1 and 0 at the 5% 
level in two of three models. We can therefore conclude that the introduction of the capital input 





Conventional models in industrial organisation (particularly those following the SCP paradigm) 
state that in concentrated industries active firms can count on a significant market power, and 
competition can be reduced if they exercise some form of market collusion. In contrast, recent 
theoretical analyses show that strong concentration processes do not necessarily prevent 
competition among firms. 
This paper has relied on a non-linear simultaneous-equation model for the period 1988-2000 
(formed by a demand equation, a cost equation and a price-cost margin equation) in order to 
identify the degree of competitiveness characterising the eight Italian largest banks, the only which 
operate nationwide and have a noteworthy size and a significant market share. The results strongly 
reject the hypothesis of collusion or coordination among them, and are consistent with a more 
competitive conduct than the Cournot outcome. 
Given the special features of the banking industry (asymmetric information, personal 
relationships between banks and customers, reputation), it seems that the degree of competition is 
considerable. Our findings are in line with the results of the recent literature in this field as well as 
with those of other studies on Italian data, and contradict the conclusions of the SCP approach, for 
which the tendency to concentration in a market is to be considered with concern for its anti-
competitive consequences. Quite to contrary, our empirical evidence shows that in the Italian 
banking industry there is no conflict between competition and concentration. 
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Appendix A – Data description 
 
The panel of this study is composed by the eight largest Italian banks: Banco di Napoli, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 
Banca di Roma, Cassa di Risparmio delle Province Lombarde, Banca Commerciale Italiana, Credito Italiano, Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena, Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino. They are regarded as “largest” also in the statistics of Banca 
d’Italia (the Central Bank of Italy). 
The dataset is derived from the annual balance sheets of each bank as well as from statistical reports of Banca d’Italia 
and Istat (Italian Statistical Institute). It considers annual data from 1988 through 2000. All values have been expressed 
in real terms (1995 values) by using the GDP deflator. 
The following variables have been used for the regression analysis.  
- GDP: gross domestic product (source: Istat) 
- Loans: short-term and long-term loans (source: Banca d’Italia and balance sheets) 
- Deposits: include savings deposits, certificates of deposit and bonds issued by banks (source: Banca d’Italia 
and balance sheets) 
- Loan revenue: interest accrued on the whole loans portfolio (source: balance sheets) 
- Deposit cost: interest paid on deposit liabilities (source: balance sheets) 
- Wage cost: direct and indirect staff costs (source: balance sheets) 
- Capital costs: net operating costs different from interest and staff costs (source: balance sheets) 
- Funds under management: include customer deposits, interbank deposits, shareholders’ equity and reserves 
(source: balance sheets) 
- Branches: number of local offices with operational capabilities (source: Banca d’Italia and balance sheets) 




Appendix B – Sample descriptive statistics and list of variables 
 
Variable  Mean  S. D.  Min  Max  Median 
GDP  911947.2 53924.5 826059.0 1012802 896830.0 
Loans  32402.3 12174.4 13057.1 77875.5 30985.7 
Deposits  33932.7 11236.8 15589.5 75390.4 31492.6 
Loan revenue  4968.3  1606.9  1410.3 10647.7 4764.1 
Deposit cost  3529.8 1319.0  769.4  8395.3 3261.4 
Wage cost  932.5  204.6  516.2 1401.0 895.6 
Capital cost  565.9  202.7  226.1 1376.9 539.6 
Funds under management  59925.2  17256.9  24518.9 120410.6 58777.2 
Branches (*)  753.6 261.3  381  1398 688.0 
Employees (*)  16363.6 4045.5  10427  26766 15364.0 
pi (**)  0.1621 0.0448 0.0734 0.2754 0.1713 
pj (**)  0.1588 0.0389 0.0856 0.2076 0.1656 
w1i (**)  0.1074 0.0345 0.0380 0.1860 0.1060 
w2i (***)  57.69  6.38  44.31 74.40 56.46 
w3i (***)  772.8  204.8  409.5 1483.8 790.2 
All variables are expressed in millions of 1995 euro, except: 
(*) Number of units 
(**) Ratios 
(***) Thousands of 1995 euro 
 
 
Variable    
qi  = loans 
pi  =  interest revenue / total loans 
pj  =  interest revenue / total loans (for the group of the other banks) 
Y  =  Gross Domestic Product 
BRi  =  number of branches 
w1i  =  interest expenses / total deposits 
w2i  =  labour cost / number of employees 
w3i  =  other operating costs / funds under management 
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Table 1 – The Italian banking system: descriptive data 
 








1988  423896  639986  53068  51947 1100 15363 
1989  479284  681025  60047  55482 1085 15577 
1990  515000  714349  63956  56395 1064 17721 
1991  547954  744953  67419  56223 1043 19080 
1992  586972  774512  80415  62858 1025 20784 
1993  589788  821124  75281  61755    992  22004 
1994  573709  801208  64421  50050    965  23000 
1995  562697  786548  70737  50503    976  24040 
1996  543902  790971  67208  49084    938  24421 
1997  567300  729362  57698  39846    935  25251 
1998  586666  701381  50369  30177    922  26255 
1999  632551  688510  41463  20140    877  27132 
2000  704766  679891  47726  23227    841  28175 
All variables are expressed in millions of 1995 euro (unless otherwise indicated) 






Table 2 – The Italian eight largest banks: grouped descriptive data 
 















(% of total 
deposits) 
Loan share 
(% of total 
loans) 
1988  181039  226222  34798  24902  6740 2627 3630  123865  35.35  42.71 
1989  205534  235427  40656  30213  6674 3018 3711  118623  34.57  42.88 
1990  222097  234045  42238  31585  6688 3174 3974  122817  32.76  43.13 
1991  235879  253862  45355  33516  7600 3827 5058  133213  34.08  43.05 
1992  244849  251371  49656  36362  7855 4134 5570  131939  32.46  41.71 
1993  255692  275823  47020  34325  8209 4715 6192  137707  33.59  43.35 
1994  265508  289895  41625  29564  8302 4774 6523  137336  36.18  46.28 
1995  281972  296537  46613  34373  8171 5180 6837  140726  37.70  50.11 
1996  257868  284069  40542  29370  8111 5126 6825  133877  35.91  47.41 
1997  271223  286864  35369  24640  7726 5844 7238  134129  39.33  47.81 
1998  291460  289118  32406  21391  7091 5144 7377  130263  41.22  49.68 
1999  309722  294084  26948  16082  6791 5063 7471  126729  42.71  48.96 
2000  347000  311681  33480  20779  7024 6232 7971  130588  45.84  49.24 
All variables are expressed in millions of 1995 euro (unless otherwise indicated) 
Source: Banca d’Italia and individual balance sheets 
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Table 3a – System estimation results for the two-factor specification 
 
    Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
DEMAND EQUATION (dependent variable: lnqi)       
lnpi  a1  -1.7542*** (-8.79)  -0.7741*** (-4.85)  -0.8966*** (-5.63)  -0.6691*** (-4.08)  -0.8096*** (-4.98)  -2.1326*** (-11.36)  -2.1723*** (-11.95) 
lnpj  a2  1.6591*** (6.01)  0.5196** (2.11)  0.6896*** (2.75)  0.5656*** (2.81)  0.7771*** (3.82)  1.5829*** (4.17)  1.6422*** (4.63) 
lnY  a3  0.3830 (0.35)  4.1094** (2.53)  4.2151** (2.52)  -0.6260 (-0.89)  -0.3084 (-0.43)  3.4710 (1.23)  3.5470 (1.38) 
lnBRi a 4  0.3996*** (4.16)  0.6990*** (8.96)  0.7014*** (8.82)  0.6331*** (9.01)  0.6373*** (8.84)  0.4290*** (3.99)  0.3809*** (3.85) 
t a5  -  -0.0608** (-2.33)  -0.0640** (-2.42)  -  -  0.0063 (0.15)  0.0351 (0.86) 
t 
2  a6  -  -0.0019 (-0.86)  -0.0016 (-0.71)  -  -  -0.0062 (-1.60)  -0.0078** (-2.16) 
Intercept  a0  6.5444 (0.30)  -  -  -  -  -57.8524 (-0.99)  -59.1743 (-1.12) 
Adj. R
2    0.5177 0.8315 0.8319 0.8192 0.8216 0.4920 0.4790 
COST EQUATION (dependent variable: lnCi)       
lnqi b 0  -0.3171 (-0.60)  -0.7021 (-1.05)  0.0002 (0.01)  0.4830 (1.02)  0.9184** (2.13)  -1.8236** (-2.44)  -3.8059*** (-5.81) 
(lnqi)
2  b1  0.0471** (2.07)  0.0742** (2.43)  0.0224 (0.87)  0.0298 (1.23)  -0.0236 (-1.21)  0.1267*** (3.49)  0.2265*** (7.23) 
lnw1i  b1  2.1088 (1.28)  0.8697 (0.56)  2.1413 (1.32)  0.6369 (0.38)  1.5405 (0.89)  1.4581 (0.97)  1.9962 (1.34) 
lnw2i  b2  -3.6536 (-0.57)  -8.2651 (-1.41)  -8.1269 (-1.32)  -6.9399 (-1.15)  -8.4922 (-1.40)  -2.6283 (-0.43)  -3.2969 (-0.56) 
(lnqi)(lnw1i)  b2  0.0442 (1.49)  0.0677 (1.58)  -0.0189 (-0.42)  0.0837*** (3.55)  0.0284 (1.20)  -0.0207 (-0.44)  -0.0531 (-1.23) 
(lnqi)(lnw2i)  b3  0.0483 (0.68)  0.0804 (0.79)  0.0747 (0.98)  -0.0309 (-0.37)  0.0520 (0.90)  0.0552 (0.54)  0.0944 (1.32) 
(lnw1i)
2  b4  -0.2175*** (-2.93)  -0.1361** (-2.13)  -0.1352** (-2.04)  -0.1708** (-2.37)  -0.1761** (-2.37)  -0.1452** (-2.35)  -0.1627** (-2.55) 
(lnw2i)
2  b5  0.1547 (0.21)  0.7360 (1.07)  0.6962 (0.98)  0.7828 (1.14)  0.8004 (1.13)  0.1128 (0.17)  0.1043 (0.16) 
(lnw1i)(lnw2i)  b7  -0.8348** (-2.28)  -0.5795* (-1.70)  -0.5277 (-1.49)  -0.5640 (-1.46)  -0.5607 (-1.41)  -0.3718 (-1.19)  -0.3847 (-1.19) 
t  b10  -  0.0435*** (3.60)  0.0481*** (3.85)  -  -  0.0563*** (4.34)  0.0658*** (4.99) 
t 
2  b11  -  -0.0049*** (-5.17)  -0.0052*** (-5.37)  -  -  -0.0058*** (-5.70)  -0.0063*** (-6.07) 
Intercept  b0  22.7375 (1.53)  -  -  -  -  32.7572** (2.16)  52.0940*** (3.64) 
Adj. R
2    0.8784 0.9308 0.9263 0.9041 0.9003 0.9054 0.9023 
t-statistics for the parameter estimates in parentheses (*** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level) 
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Table 3a – System estimation results for the two-factor specification (continued) 
 
    Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
PRICE-COST MARGIN EQUATION (dependent variable: pi)      
Common conj.der.  l  -0.4182** (-2.15)  -  -3.1203** (-2.16)  -  -2.7925*** (-2.68)  -  0.2701*** (2.87) 
Bank 1’s c.d.  l1  -  -5.1181* (-1.80)  -  -4.8176** (-2.25)  -  -0.0522 (-0.29)  - 
Bank 2’s c.d.  l2  -  -5.4620* (-1.79)  -  -5.3534** (-2.20)  -  -0.0439 (-0.28)  - 
Bank 3’s c.d.  l3  -  -5.3892* (-1.80)  -  -5.3295** (-2.23)  -  -0.0637 (-0.37)  - 
Bank 4’s c.d.  l4  -  -4.1153* (-1.84)  -  -3.8178** (-2.25)  -  0.0420 (0.29)  - 
Bank 5’s c.d.  l5  -  -4.9979* (-1.81)  -  -4.8477** (-2.24)  -  -0.0174 (-0.12)  - 
Bank 6’s c.d.  l6  -  -3.8768* (-1.80)  -  -4.0192** (-2.25)  -  0.0651 (0.50)  - 
Bank 7’s c.d.  l7  -  -3.8212* (-1.82)  -  -3.5988** (-2.25)  -  0.0582 (0.46)  - 
Bank 8’s c.d.  l8  -  -5.1596* (-1.82)  -  -4.6153** (-2.23)  -  -0.0280 (-0.19)  - 
t  g1  -  -0.0042*** (-2.89)  -0.0030* (-1.69)  -  -  -0.0051*** (-3.62)  -0.0092*** (-5.55) 
t 
2  g2  -  0.0003** (2.58)  0.0002 (1.23)  -  -  0.0003*** (2.80)  0.0006*** (4.32) 
Adj. R
2    0.9790 0.9819 0.9798 0.9806 0.9784 0.9873 0.9602 
t-statistics for the parameter estimates in parentheses (*** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level) 
 
 
Wald statistics for bank-specific dummy variables (chi-square test) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
DEMAND EQUATION (dependent variable: lnqi)      
H0 : a7 = a8 = ... = a14 = 0  -  226.63***  217.90***  211.78***  203.52***  -  - 
H0 : a7 = a8 = ... = a14    -  223.70*** 215.04*** 210.90*** 203.42***  -  - 
COST EQUATION (dependent variable: lnCi)      
H0 : b12 = b13 = ... = b19 = 0  -  38.18*** 38.03*** 34.66*** 34.94***  -  - 
H0 : b12 = b13 = ... = b19  -  36.29*** 36.42*** 33.15*** 32.98***  -  - 
PRICE-COST MARGIN EQUATION (dependent variable: pi)      
H0 : (l1 + l2 + ... + l8)/8 = 0  - 3.37* - 5.17** -  0.01 - 
H0 : l1 = l2 = ... = l8  - 2.77 - 3.90 - 3.40 - 
(*** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level) 
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Table 3b – System estimation results for the three-factor specification 
 
    Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
DEMAND EQUATION (dependent variable: lnqi)      
lnpi  a1  -1.8054*** (-9.04)  -0.8547*** (-5.36)  -0.9928*** (-6.25)  -0.7144*** (-4.35)  -0.9572*** (-5.96)  -2.1539*** (-10.94)  -2.1748*** (-11.22) 
lnpj  a2  1.8126*** (6.47)  0.5831** (2.36)  0.7288*** (2.90)  0.6520*** (3.21)  0.9180*** (4.54)  1.5738*** (4.16)  1.5271*** (4.16) 
lnY  a3  1.0368 (0.93)  4.2810*** (2.63)  4.2831** (2.56)  -0.2505 (-0.36)  -0.2392 (-0.33)  3.9761 (1.43)  3.9175 (1.49) 
lnBRi a 4  0.4040*** (4.20)  0.6845*** (8.76)  0.6810*** (8.57)  0.6130*** (8.78)  0.6181*** (8.54)  0.4187*** (3.96)  0.3864*** (3.83) 
t a5    -0.0592** (-2.26)  -0.0590** (-2.23)  -  -  0.0027 (0.06)  0.0259 (0.62) 
t 
2  a6  -  -0.0022 (-1.00)  -0.0022 (-0.98)  -  -  -0.0066* (-1.72)  -0.0082** (-2.23) 
Intercept  a0  -6.7802 (-0.30)  -  -  -  -  -68.2109 (-1.19)  -66.9796 (-1.23) 
Adj. R
2    0.5175 0.8318 0.8306 0.8210 0.8215 0.4888 0.4800 
COST EQUATION (dependent variable: lnCi)      
lnqi b 0  -0.3747 (-0.73)  -0.6130 (-0.93)  0.1311 (0.24)  -0.1770 (-0.35)  0.8227* (1.91)  -0.9100 (-1.40)  -2.0978*** (-3.73) 
(lnqi)
2  b1  0.0286 (1.31)  0.0563* (1.80)  0.0076 (0.28)  0.0353 (1.54)  -0.0360* (-1.96)  0.0688** (2.14)  0.1371*** (4.80) 
lnw1i  b1  2.1697 (1.09)  0.9712 (0.54)  2.2051 (1.19)  1.9118 (0.93)  2.7883 (1.32)  0.4496 (0.29)  0.9287 (0.60) 
lnw2i  b2  -6.9697 (-0.89)  -13.4079* (-1.93)  -13.1765* (-1.88)  -14.6930* (-1.91)  -16.6530** (-2.13)  -6.4626 (-1.06)  -6.4596 (-1.06) 
lnw3i  b3  -0.1734 (-0.08)  1.5871 (0.86)  0.8937 (0.46)  2.5953 (1.30)  1.7611 (0.85)  -0.8235 (-0.49)  -1.1177 (-0.65) 
(lnqi)(lnw1i)  b2  0.0201 (0.66)  0.0684 (1.63)  -0.0195 (-0.47)  0.0587** (2.45)  0.0092 (0.38)  0.0087 (0.21)  -0.0265 (-0.70) 
(lnqi)(lnw2i)  b3  0.0528 (0.78)  0.0658 (0.66)  0.0672 (0.94)  0.0053 (0.07)  0.0542 (0.98)  0.0769 (0.85)  0.0923 (1.48) 
(lnqi)(lnw3i)  b4  -0.0657** (-2.27)  -0.0644* (-1.85)  -0.0369 (-0.99)  -0.0747*** (-3.30)  -0.0481** (-1.99)  -0.0317 (-1.05)  0.0033 (0.12) 
(lnw1i)
2  b4  -0.1982** (-2.34)  -0.0940 (-1.45)  -0.0961 (-1.42)  -0.1281* (-1.67)  -0.1304 (-1.64)  -0.1322** (-2.13)  -0.1423** (-2.20) 
(lnw2i)
2  b5  0.6711 (0.81)  1.2625* (1.80)  1.2398* (1.70)  1.5455* (1.92)  1.6862** (2.02)  0.5794 (0.95)  0.5322 (0.84) 
(lnw3i)
2  b6  -0.0741 (-0.65)  -0.0595 (-0.63)  -0.0789 (-0.80)  0.0060 (0.06)  -0.0318 (-0.30)  -0.1232 (-1.39)  -0.1021 (-1.11) 
(lnw1i)(lnw2i)  b7  -0.7478* (-1.76)  -0.5523 (-1.49)  -0.5085 (-1.31)  -0.5286 (-1.21)  -0.5449 (-1.20)  -0.3684 (-1.16)  -0.3401 (-1.04) 
(lnw1i)(lnw3i)  b8  -0.0254 (-0.17)  0.0040 (0.03)  -0.0114 (-0.09)  0.1601 (1.09)  0.1567 (1.04)  -0.1180 (-1.06)  -0.1100 (-0.95) 
(lnw2i)(lnw3i)  b9  0.1561 (0.46)  -0.1973 (-0.72)  -0.1950 (-0.68)  -0.1965 (-0.62)  -0.1895 (-0.58)  0.0461 (0.18)  0.0172 (0.07) 
t  b10  -  0.0099 (0.67)  0.0155 (1.00)  -  -  0.0148 (1.05)  0.0282** (1.98) 
t 
2  b11  -  -0.0033*** (-3.16)  -0.0038*** (-3.49)  -  -  -0.0039*** (-3.85)  -0.0047*** (-4.53) 
Intercept  b0  29.7677 (1.47)  -  -  -  -  29.3784* (1.76)  39.7251** (2.45) 
Adj. R
2    0.8762 0.9386 0.9343 0.9062 0.9025 0.9259 0.9221 
t-statistics for the parameter estimates in parentheses (*** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level) 
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Table 3b – System estimation results for the three-factor specification (continued) 
 
    Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
PRICE-COST MARGIN EQUATION (dependent variable: pi)      
Common conj.der.  l  -0.3692** (-2.13)  -  -3.4578** (-2.15)  -  -1.9234*** (-2.85)  -  -0.0363 (-0.25) 
Bank 1’s c.d.  l1  -  -6.1562* (-1.90)  -  -3.9559** (-2.47)  -  -0.6755* (-1.74)  - 
Bank 2’s c.d.  l2  -  -6.4810* (-1.86)  -  -4.2601** (-2.42)  -  -0.5775* (-1.79)  - 
Bank 3’s c.d.  l3  -  -6.5862* (-1.87)  -  -4.3818** (-2.45)  -  -0.6321* (-1.75)  - 
Bank 4’s c.d.  l4  -  -4.6797** (-2.00)  -  -3.3822** (-2.48)  -  -0.3646 (-1.43)  - 
Bank 5’s c.d.  l5  -  -5.6881* (-1.93)  -  -3.7613** (-2.46)  -  -0.5332* (-1.79)  - 
Bank 6’s c.d.  l6  -  -4.5345* (-1.93)  -  -3.2228** (-2.46)  -  -0.3449 (-1.38)  - 
Bank 7’s c.d.  l7  -  -4.0619** (-1.99)  -  -2.7469** (-2.47)  -  -0.3826 (-1.57)  - 
Bank 8’s c.d.  l8  -  -6.0764* (-1.92)  -  -4.0033** (-2.45)  -  -0.5079* (-1.75)  - 
t  g1  -  -0.0021 (-1.20)  -0.0019 (-0.94)  -  -  -0.0035** (-2.24)  -0.0069*** (-4.32) 
t 
2  g2  -  0.0002 (1.24)  0.0001 (0.65)  -  -  0.0002* (1.97)  0.0004*** (3.54) 
Adj. R
2    0.9852 0.9841 0.9818 0.9823 0.9822 0.9900 0.9781 
t-statistics for the parameter estimates in parentheses (*** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level) 
 
 
Wald statistics for bank-specific dummy variables (chi-square test) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
DEMAND EQUATION (dependent variable: lnqi)      
H0 : a7 = a8 = ... = a14 = 0  -  220.73***  211.07***  207.86***  192.84***  -  - 
H0 : a7 = a8 = ... = a14    -  217.42*** 208.00*** 207.68*** 192.78***  -  - 
COST EQUATION (dependent variable: lnCi)      
H0 : b12 = b13 = ... = b19 = 0  - 18.99**  16.81**  37.17***  35.76*** - - 
H0 : b12 = b13 = ... = b19  - 16.40**  15.28**  34.11***  33.78*** - - 
PRICE-COST MARGIN EQUATION (dependent variable: pi)      
H0 : (l1 + l2 + ... + l8)/8 = 0  - 3.86** - 6.26** - 3.20* - 
H0 : l1 = l2 = ... = l8  - 2.72 - 4.87 - 4.67 - 
(*** = significant at 1% level; ** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level) 
 